In your review of Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011) you report that he has delivered a “full catalogue” of biases, shortcuts, and cognitive illusions to which the human species regularly succumbs when making economic decisions (“Not So Smart Now,” October 29, 2011). Would that the catalogue were full, though. Together with his late colleague, Amos Tversky, the author has come up with a surprising range of boo-boos not only in human decision-making, but also in the economic theory vainly purporting to explain it. It is thus wonderful that he has received a Nobel prize in economics in 2002, for his colleague had died in 1996. Both of them cognitive psychologists rather than economists, they provided the foundations for behavioral economics, which has re-examined much of economic theory for its oblivion to the assorted biases, shortcuts, and cognitive illusions in human thinking. It can only be hoped that this new branch of economics will in due time fulfill the dream of coming up with a full catalogue of such blemishes. In the meanwhile, much of economic theory should remain on hold, as the present economic crisis demonstrates.