1. The sharp division between planning theory and practice, which runs through the institutional structure (university-planning institutions), as well as through the mental images and conceptual frameworks shared by both theoreticians and practitioners of planning, is one of the most serious obstacles to the development of both spheres. The real basis for this division is the division of mental and manual labor, one aspect of which is the division of planning and plan-execution.

Theory and practice of planning must be understood in their dialectical unity, however. This requires that we consider the question of organization.

2. As Lukács put it:

Organization is the form of mediation between theory and practice. And, as in every dialectical relationship, the terms of the relation only acquire concreteness and reality in and by virtue of this mediation. The ability of organization to mediate between theory and practice is seen most clearly by the way in which it manifests a much greater, finer and more confident sensitivity towards divergent trends than any other sector of political thought and action. On the level of pure theory the most disparate views and tendencies are able to co-exist peacefully, antagonisms are only expressed in the form of discussions that can be contained within the framework of one and the same organization without disrupting it. But no sooner are these same questions given organizational form than they turn out to be sharply opposed and even incompatible.

Every “theoretical” tendency or clash of views must immediately develop an organizational arm if it is to rise above the level of pure theory or abstract opinion, that is to say, if it really intends to point the way to its own fulfillment in practice.[1]

To paraphrase Lukács, we can say that the criterion for the acceptance of a scientific theory concerning social development, besides the test of logical consistency, are its organizational implications in the context of socialist self-government as social planning. In other words, the theory the application of which would stimulate and guide the development of socialist self-government organizationally would pass the test. This is of extreme importance, since this test is usually defined abstractly, e.g., requiring that the theory in question be based on Marxism, which actually only demands that we define Marxism for the test to be meaningful. This leads directly to dogmatism.

3. This test implies the understanding of the distinction between praxis and techne, two concepts that underlie very distinct interpretations of “application” of theory. In Habermas’ words:

Marx, to be sure, viewed the problem of making history with will and consciousness as one of the practical mastery of previously ungoverned processes of social development. Others, however, have understood it as a technical problem. They want to bring society under control in the same way as nature by reconstructing it according to the pattern of self-regulated systems of purposive-rational action and adaptive behavior. This intention is to be found not only among technocrats of capitalist planning but also among those of bureaucratic socialism. Only the technocratic consciousness obscures the fact that this reconstruction could be achieved at no less a cost than closing off the only dimension that is essential, because it is susceptible to humanization, as a structure of interaction mediated by ordinary language.[2]

It may be added that this distinction further implies differentiation between “qualitative” and “quantitative” use of mathematical models, where “qualitative” interpretation involves direction of movement of certain variables, ordinal relations between certain magnitudes, etc., while “quantitative” interpretation concentrates upon exact numerical values of the variables with the intention to use this information in the construction of the plan itself.

4. The concept of organization as the form of mediation between theory and practice leads us to consider the problem of organization of research in social theory, and indirectly in the theory of social planning. Gouldner explores this question with great clarity:

Since social theory is grounded in social structure, the first task of sociology and social theory is to create the new communities—specifically, theoretical collectives—for rational discourse by social theorists. In my view, it is essential to establish—in the double sense of to know and to institute—the human and social conditions for the restriction of irrational and ideological components of discourse, for the control and exposure of false consciousness.

This task has two sides. One is oppositional, polemical, critical, isolating and combative. The theoretical collective must create a rift in the social world, separate itself from conventional and dominant definitions of social reality, and struggle against the institutions and conditions that maintain them, always taking care to protect itself against their inevitable backlash.

The other side, however, is constructive. Within any liberated social space that we manage to carve out, we can begin to design and construct theoretical communities that nourish and support rational discourse in sociology and social theory. As Jürgen Habermas has stressed, the most essential social condition for rational discourse is to eliminate all force and violence. Where force and violence remain possible, there will be an inescapable pressure that—openly or covertly, crudely or subtly—sets into motion a thousand inducements to false consciousness.

Rational theorizing means above all rational discourse in theory: it means dialectic and dialogue among truth—committed men [sic!] joined in a community that speaks a common language. It is the rock-bottom foundation for the control of false consciousness and for the continuing critical development of social theory. Such theoretical collectives are far more important to the development of social theory and sociology than all the technical instruments and rules, and all the courses on research methods and techniques.

The university’s central problem is its failure as a community in which rational discourse about social worlds is possible. This is partly because rational discourse as such ceased to be its dominant value and was superseded by a quest for knowledge products and information products that could be sold or promised for funding, prestige and power—rewards bestowed by the state and the larger society that is most bent upon subverting rational discourse about itself. Indeed, theoretical communities need to protect themselves from impediments to rational discourse still growing within the university as much as from those in the larger society. In my view, the university provides a partially cleared but immensely threatened space in which such theory-generating communities might grow. The capacity of such theoretical collectivities to reach beyond the university, while maintaining a foothold there, is more than a way to express their relevance to the problems of the larger world; it is probably also a requisite for the maintenance of rational discourse in social theory.

My assumption, then, comes down to this: (1) the central problem facing all sociologies today is the interrelation between theory and practice, and (2) one can best enter this circle by community-creating efforts, and most particularly, by creating new theoretical collectives. In short, my assumption is that it is organization, social organization, that today provides the key to mediation between social theory and social practice.[3]

Gouldner’s analysis is most relevant for our analysis of social planning, regardless of the fact that we must augment it by considering the preconditions a socio-economic system must satisfy in order for this analysis to be useful in a particular social environment. This task, however, is beyond the reach of a short note.

It may be added, however, that planning necessarily involves direct contact with the wider community, and that as a consequence of this the need for protection against destructive intrusion of the community is even more obvious in this case. But the potential benefits stemming from direct contact must not be overlooked. Namely, the “real life” problems appear in their full concreteness, defining themselves the interaction between relevant disciplines, which otherwise threaten to seek a division of labor along the academic lines.

Footnotes

1. Lukács, G., History and Class Consciousness, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1971 (first published in 1922), p. 299.

2. Habermas, J., Toward a Rational Society, Boston: Beacon Press, 1970, pp. 116-117.

3. Gouldner, A.W., For Sociology: Renewal and Critique in Sociology Today, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1975 (first published in 1973), pp. 78-80.